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INDIAN DALITS AND HINDUTVA STRATEGIES
Indian Dalits and Hindutva Strategies
Seth Schoenhaus 
The Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, is a right-wing nationalist political party 
charged by its parent organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Singh (RSS), to 
spread its ideology of Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) through the political process.1 
In doing this, the BJP has gained national prominence, as seen most recently in its 
resounding 2014 victory in which Narendra Modi shot to power as Prime Minister 
of India.2 However, the party has made itself into the stalwart political arm of In-
dia’s burgeoning middle class: conservative, fairly wealthy voters who tend to see 
themselves as the backbone of India’s emerging global might and economic prow-
ess.3 In order to increase its share of power, the BJP and other Hindutva organiza-
tions have increasingly realized the need to reach out to Scheduled Caste voters, 
specifically Dalits: those who have largely existed at the bottom of the Indian caste 
system, below even those considered “untouchable.”4 Dalits often find themselves 
on the fringe of acceptable Indian society due to their historically low caste posi-
tion, so their receptiveness to Hindutva politics is quite curious. 
In order to court Dalits, the ideological message of Hindutva has shifted, as 
has its dissemination among populaces that were not formerly receptive to its na-
tionalist thrust. This paper examines the methods by which Hindutva activists and 
politicians have courted Dalit voters, specifically focusing on the appropriation 
of Dalit traditions, the Hindutva meta-narrative of Lord Ram, and the claiming of 
Hindu space. This examination takes place through the lens of a clashing of ideals, 
and will thus begin with an overview of Hindutva as a political and religious mes-
sage, moving on to delve into the Dalit experience and collective identity. 
Hindutva: The Ideology of a Hindu India
Badri Narayan, a professor of social anthropology and frequent political 
contributor to various Indian newspapers, characterizes Hindutva as a strain of 
“cultural nationalism … based on the moral and cultural code preached by the 
ancient Hindu religious epics like the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.”5 More 
1   Radhika Ramaseshan, “The BJP and the RSS: Family Squabbles Turn Intense,” Economic and Political Weekly 1, no. 1 (2013): 
http://www.epw.in 
2   Ibid. 
3   Sumit Sarkar, “Indian Nationalism and the Politics of Hindutva,” in Making India Hindu, ed. David Ludden (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 270-293.
4   Badri Narayan, Memory, Identity and the Politics of Appropriation: ‘Saffronisation’ Among the Dalits of North India, ISAS Working 
Papers (Singapore: Institute for South Asian Studies, 2015), 2.
5   Badri Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva: Saffron Politics and Dalit Mobilisation (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 8. 
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specifically, one might discuss Hindutva activism in the context of Indian public 
culture, characterizing the ideology as a mix of the paternalistic and xenopho-
bic sentiments expressed by conservative Indians as a result of a changing Indian 
society. As India has become a global powerhouse increasingly exposed to new 
ideas and practices, the political mobilization of lower castes and rising consum-
erism in the broader Indian sphere has “fractured social imaginings and notions of 
order and hierarchy.”6 As such, Hindutva activists and supporters share a general 
goal of asserting their Indian-ness (the meaning of Hindutva) through a sort of 
reclamation of their native homeland from those who would see it destroyed (thus 
destroying Indian identity itself).7 This has tended to create an “othering” process, 
often explained by Hindutva detractors as projecting imagined or otherwise inac-
curate wrongs done to Hindus onto minority communities, thus creating racist 
sentiments based upon ethnicity.8 
Supporters of Hindutva, though, characterize the ideology as a defense of 
the Hindu religion alongside a sober recognition of the threat that “outside” re-
ligious traditions, most notably Islam, pose. However, analysis of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party webpage entitled “Hindutva: The Great Nationalist Ideology” reveals 
a strong sectarian bent, referring to Muslims using words such as “barbaric,” 
“hordes,” “bloody,” and “unwilling to change.”9 As such, the overarching theme of 
Hindutva as the BJP perceives it is not only a rewriting of history with Hindus as 
the benevolent idealists and Muslims as the violent barbarians, but a generaliza-
tion of who is “Muslim” and who is “Hindu.” In making these generalizations, one 
becomes aware of a theme central to the Hindutva idea: Hindu unity, especially 
across castes. The webpage makes no note of certain caste values, heroes, idols, 
or practices, instead discussing Hindus as an already unified group of people with 
similar viewpoints and like minds. While the significance of this imagined unity 
is discussed in greater detail later, we can note here that the notion of a universal 
Hinduism presents a great challenge to courting voters, such as Dalits, who feel 
they have been left out of the gains made by the modern Indian state. As such, the 
otherness heaped on to Muslims on the webpage has been extended to include 
those Dalits who have converted to Islam or other religions in protest of their poor 
treatment under the Hindu caste system. In fact, as Hindutva has flourished since 
the 1920s as an upper caste reaction to progress made by formerly oppressed 
6   Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 8. 
7   More conversation on the Hinduisation of space to come later in the paper. 
8   Jyotirmaya Sharma, Hindutva (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003), 1. 
9   Bharatiya Janata Party, “Hindutva: The Great Nationalist Ideology,” Bharatiya Janata Party, last modified 2015, http://www.bjp.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=369:hindutva-the-great-nationalist-ideology&Itemid=501 
2
Denison Journal of Religion, Vol. 16 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/religion/vol16/iss1/1
57
groups, we can extend the overt fear of Muslims to cover an underlying fear of 
lower-caste Hindus as they mobilize and demand their equal rights under the 
secular state.10 Understanding Dalit identity, then, is key to an overall comprehen-
sion of the tactics used by Hindutva activists in gaining their support. 
As a final observation concerning the BJP’s depiction of Hindutva, one cannot 
fail to notice the narrative structure of the webpage entry. The very fact that the 
ideology is presented as a story, complete with moments in history during which 
Muslim invaders, such as the Mughals, attempted to destroy dharma, points to the 
greater Hindu tradition of imparting religious knowledge in the form of a story. 
In fact, an account of one scholar’s experiences with a Hindu holy man led her 
to remark that storytelling is “an expression of deep-rooted cultural themes.”11 
Folding this observation into an analysis of the BJP’s explanation of Hindutva, one 
might surmise that the webpage is in the form of a narrative specifically to play to 
Hindus’ feelings of cultural belonging, unity, and overall Indian-ness. Additionally, 
scholarly analysis of traditional Hindu storytelling techniques reveal emphasis on 
“characterization,” or the incorporation of targeted audience members into wide-
ly-known folk stories in order to convey a pre-conceived message or idea about 
the general nature of something as it applies to the listener.12 This point will also 
be vital to understanding the reasoning behind certain methods and techniques for 
Hindutva recruitment of Dalits, which this paper comes to later. 
Who is a Dalit? Understanding Dalit Identity and Dynamics
The term Dalit means broken, oppressed, or ground down; it has been used 
in India’s northern states since the 1920s but was not widely used until the 1960s, 
when radical groups such as the Dalit Panthers (a group modeled after the Ameri-
can Black Panthers, using militant ideology to assert their rights as a marginalized 
people) appropriated the term to assert their political standpoint.13 In practice, a 
Dalit is one formerly designated as an “untouchable,” or one existing below the 
caste system, relegated to jobs and locales with diminished or non-existent ritual 
purity in a traditional Hindu context.14 There are several sub-castes within the 
broader Dalit fold, such as Pasi, Dhobi, Kori, and others, and divisions between 
these Dalit castes are often widened or traversed based on local and state-level 
10   Kama Kellie Maclean, “Embracing the Untouchables: The BJP and Scheduled Caste Votes,” Asian Studies Review 54, no. 4 
(1999): 489.
11   Kirin Narayan, Storytellers, Saints, and Scoundrels: Folk Narrative in Hindu Religious Teaching (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 11.  
12   Ibid., 235. 
13   Juned Shaikh, “Who Needs Identity? Dalit Studies and the Politics of Recognition,” India Review 11, no. 3 (2012), 200.
14   Deepa S. Reddy, Religious Identity and Political Destiny: Hindutva in the Culture of Ethnicism (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2005), 87. 
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electoral politics and other processes deciding balances of power.15 However, 
scholars of the past several decades have noted a shift within lower-caste dynam-
ics in their observations of massacres of Dalits in the 1970s and 1980s: Dalit 
recognition of caste as an externally imposed force of organization on members of 
the lower echelons of society was simultaneously rejected and internalized. One 
literature review proves important in explaining this phenomenon: “While caste is 
practised and called upon to reassert dominance and power by the upper castes, 
it is also posited as a positive identity of a subordinated community of untouch-
able castes.”16 Thus, we might understand the notion of caste division to Dalits as 
a historical roadblock to success and integration in society but also as a modern 
day tool for unification and political, social, and cultural power. 
Dalit Unification: Challenges to Obtaining Political Power
This Dalit unification and pride in their cultural heritage has taken the form 
of a “racialization” of their caste identity and situation. As the Dalit Panther imita-
tion of the American Black Panther Party was noted earlier, Dalit identity has been 
increasingly externalized as an ethnic or even racial divide between them and 
Hindus of other castes. Because of this, Dalits in recent years have delved into 
their communal histories, invoking experiences, myths, legends, heroes, and other 
forms of cultural pride in order to solidify their intra-caste solidarity.17 Though this 
paper covers this communal history and shared Dalit ideology more later, suffice 
it here to remark that Dalit identity has been shaped around communal discourse 
at small levels often confined to local and state geographical realms. As such, one 
examination of Dalit voting patterns revealed a plethora of local party allegiances 
without the presence of a unified, solid political front.18 The problem of translating 
cultural and historical identity into the greater political realm, then, has proved 
a challenge for the Dalit community in recent years, evidenced by the stratifica-
tion within the greater Dalit caste as it pertains to economic success. As India has 
gained prominence in recent years in the global economy, groups and individuals 
from all across the caste system, not just upper-caste businesspeople, have seen 
their economic salience rise astronomically. In this context, some Dalits have be-
come more successful than others, and one study examining electoral politics in 
India’s majoritarian system concludes that income differences between groups, 
whether they are of the same caste or not, predicts differences in voting patterns 
15   Shaikh, “Who Needs Identity,” 203. 
16   K. Satyanarayana, “Dalit Reconfiguration of Caste: Representation, Identity and Politics,” The Critical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2014), 
48.
17   Ibid., 59. 
18   Rahul Verma, “Dalit Voting Patterns,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 39 (2009): 95.
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and political allegiances.19 Because of this, higher income Dalits are likely to vote 
differently than lower income Dalits, and additionally will lean on their ethnicity 
as a specific group of Dalit to make their political decisions rather than their iden-
tity as a Dalit first and foremost.20
With the formerly untouchable castes making up almost 20 percent of the 
population of India, they represent a large portion of the populace and thus have 
the potential to exercise considerable political influence. Most of these Dalits, 
though, are impoverished and weak as opposed to wealthy and middle class, 
and thus the notion of Dalit unification is still essential to their equality, dignity, 
and obtainment of rights. A central challenge to meeting these goals has been 
overcoming these internal divisions—a feat often agreed to have occurred under 
Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar, a strong leader advocating for Dalit rights in the years 
surrounding the creation of the Indian state.21 His central vision surrounded an 
annihilation of caste in a more egalitarian society, and although he eventually 
led thousands of Hindu Dalits in converting to Buddhism (as he concluded that 
Hinduism was fundamentally incompatible with equality and rights for the op-
pressed), he still remains a central figure and even folk hero to many Hindu Dalits 
today.22 However, some scholars have argued that since the death of Ambedkar in 
1956, Dalits have lacked a unifying leader that claims to represent their caste as a 
whole, and have thus been susceptible to swaying from outside factions that may 
or may not adequately represent their interests.23  
In this context of economic advancement, social disunion, and a leaderless 
bloc, Dalits still attempt to drum up pride through the mining of their cultural 
icons, albeit at local levels. The next section of this paper examines the pragmatic 
(if not ideological) space this leaves for Hindutva leaders to court Dalits. This ex-
amination will take place through a cultural as well as physical lens.
The Hindu Nation: Appropriation, Metaphor, and the Politics of Representation
Ethnicization and Sanskritization
The politicizing of Dalit collective memory is not a phenomenon confined 
strictly to modern Dalits. In fact, Christophe Jaffrelot notes that castes today are 
constantly regrouping themselves, taking on characteristics, and forming orga-
nizations in order to change their societal positions and climb the social (and 
19   John D. Huber and Pavithra Suryanarayan, “Ethnic Inequality and the Ethnification of Political Parties,” World Politics 68, no. 1 
(2016), 149.
20   Ibid. 
21   Sandeep Pendse, “The Dalits and Hindutva: Gainers and Losers,” in Hindutva and Dalits: Perspectives for Understanding Com-
munal Praxis, ed. Anand Teltumbde (Kolkata: Samya, 2005), 75.  
22   Sumit Sarkar, “Indian Nationalism and the Politics of Hindutva,” 293.
23   Pendse, “The Dalits and Hindutva,” 89. 
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therefore economic and educational) ladder.24 The so-called “subordinate castes’ 
revolution” has occurred mostly in the past three decades, in response to certain 
affirmative action policies passed in order to ensure the equal representation of 
Dalits and other low-caste individuals in Indian society.25 Historically, though, 
caste grouping and mobilization has occurred since the time of the British Raj, 
when the census created more formalized caste hierarchies as well as the oppor-
tunity for social movement.26 Significant pushback from upper-caste individuals 
was not seen at a high level until the1980s and 1990s, notably with the prodding 
and support of Hindutva politicians, which led to a caste against caste mentality 
amongst many Hindus. Caste tensions and even warfare, while nothing new in 
Hindu society, were undoubtedly exacerbated with the affirmative action policies 
toward the end of the twentieth century.27 
In this climate of caste warfare, complete with the racial and ethnic iden-
tification of caste described earlier, it is important to understand the theoretical 
terminology behind caste mobilization, especially as it pertains to Dalits. Scholars 
tend to define certain caste actions as either “Sanskritization” or “Ethnicization.” 
Broadly, “Sanskritization” refers to a low-caste adoption of values or practices 
typically seen as upper-caste or Brahmanical.28 Usually, this is undertaken with 
the aim of gaining acceptance among high caste members and therefore gain-
ing access to the resources that come with membership in the upper echelon of 
Hindu society. In practice, this generally takes the form of low-castes collectively 
adopting vegetarianism or teaching Sanskrit in order to emulate upper caste prac-
tices.29 In a broad context, however, many scholars have noted the inefficacy or 
even contradictory effects of widespread Sanskritization among low-caste groups. 
They note that while the intended effect among low-caste groups as a whole is to 
promote the idea of caste fluidity and the eventual breakdown of caste through 
the ease of social changes, an unintended consequence of such upward move-
ment has been to solidify upper-caste values as definitive Hindu practices. Hindu 
identity in the context of Sanskritization, then, has been judged as valid or invalid 
based upon its subscription to the universal norm of Brahmanical values and ritual 
purity.30 In effect, Sanskritization has “strengthened the Hindu hierarchic caste-
based socio-cultural system.”31 
24   Christophe Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste and Politics in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 487. 
25   Ibid., 497. 
26   Christophe Jaffrelot, “Sanskritization vs. Ethnicization in India: Changing Identities and Caste Politics Before Mandal,” Asian 
Survey 40, no. 5 (2000), 757.
27   Ibid. 
28   Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva, 24. 
29   Jaffrelot, “Sanskritization vs. Ethnicization,” 757. 
30   Reddy, Religious Identity and Political Destiny, 87. 
31   Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva, 24.
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However, caste associations under the British colonial Raj, and subsequently 
under the Indian state, have been increasingly separated, stratified, and secular-
ized, as both of these administrative structures have struggled to reconcile caste-
based inequality with preparation for and implementation of democracy. Jaffre-
lot argues that caste associations have increasingly behaved not unlike interest 
groups, with collective economic and social goals, and with the added identifier 
of race and ethnicity as touched upon above.32 With the negative effects of San-
skritization apparent to many struggling to achieve caste mobility or emancipa-
tion, a process of “Ethnicization” has occurred, involving “alternative nonhierar-
chical social imaginaries.”33 These social imaginaries centrally involve questioning 
the hierarchy of the caste system, and therefore breaking from the traditional social 
consciousness of being at the bottom of the ladder and instead inventing a sepa-
rate cultural identity and collective history.34 While these inventions have taken on 
names such as “Non-Brahmanism” and “Dravidianism,” they generally involve the 
publication of caste histories and, at local levels, village or town elders imparting 
stories of caste heroes to younger members or even caste intermarriage.35
Despite the rise of Ethnicization among Dalits and other low-caste groups, 
especially since the popularization of identity politics in part facilitated by Amb-
dekar, many have argued that various forces inside and outside these low-caste 
groups have produced uncertainties and insecurities about their newfound identi-
ties. In researching these invented low-caste identities, many scholars and cultural 
commentators referred to village or town-level caste practices as “folk Hinduism,” 
thereby giving them the connotation of being less-than or inferior to Brahmanical 
Hinduism.36 Whether intended or not, in the translation process occurring be-
tween the academic and broader communities, some critics argue that a notion of 
traditional Hinduism has been elevated even higher, to occupy some monolithic, 
Vedic, or traditional practice among high-class, wealthy, and elite Hindus. On the 
other hand, Hindus of lower castes who have undergone Ethnicization processes 
and have thus elevated aspects of their own cultural histories have been made to 
feel inferior.37 With this in mind, along with the inevitable failure of the Ethniciza-
tion process to completely unify and immunize low-caste groups from the lure 
of upper-caste transformation, we can understand why many Dalit communities 
still desire acceptance from upper-caste Hindus. In fact, close readings of the oral 
32   Jaffrelot, “Sanskritization vs. Ethnicization,” 758.
33   Ibid. 
34   Ibid. 
35   Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva, 27. 
36   Vineeta Sinha, “Problematizing Received Categories: Revisiting ‘Folk Hinduism’ and ‘Sanskritization,’” Current Sociology 54, 
no. 1 (2006), 99.
37   Ibid., 100. 
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and written histories put out by low-caste groups in order to claim their cultural 
heritage reveal strong desires to be “appropriated into the upper caste dominated 
socio-cultural and religious order of north India by linking themselves with Brah-
manical temples, rituals, gods and goddesses and also replicating many of them.”38 
Because of these lingering sentiments of Sanskritization, one can characterize 
the general nature of Dalit and low-caste communities as fragile and divided. With 
the simultaneous and opposing pressures to at once claim their cultural identities 
as well as subscribe to Brahmanical, upper-caste values, some see Dalit communi-
ties as floundering, passive, and open to exploitation, especially with the absence 
of a strong, unifying leader. The next section of this paper deals with Hindutva 
appropriations of Ambedkar and the nationalistic politicization of the fragile Dalit 
identity in their bid to win over the electorate. Mixed with this is a discussion of the 
national Hindutva metaphor involving Lord Ram and the effects of this metaphor 
on Dalit communities. Overall, the fragility of Dalit identities and stratification of 
Dalit communities, mixed with the enormity of the population in comparison to 
other sectors of Indian society, make Dalits a prime target for political targeting. 
Hindutva and Dalits 
Understanding the ways in which Dalit communities are simultaneously 
fragile and vital to political parties is essential to understanding the ideological 
approach Hindutva politicians take in their courtship of Dalit voters. In the so-
cioeconomic context discussed above, one notices a certain clash of Dalit ideals, 
which tend to be more left-leaning or liberal, and Hindutva ideology, which tends 
to be supported more by upper-caste, middle class Hindus and is also more right-
leaning. This section of the paper, then, discusses Hindutva methods of ideological 
reconciliation in the hopes of wooing Dalits. 
Lord Ram and the Ramayana
Scholars note the widespread use of a particularly aggressive, masculine im-
age of Lord Ram used by Hindutva supporters as a metaphor for an Indian national 
consciousness.39 Specifically, Ram has been appropriated as an ideal picture of In-
dian culture: a “Hinduness claiming to encompass the authenticity and tolerance 
espoused by Gandhians as well as militant and martial traditions.”40 In the Hin-
dutva ideological paradigm, the state in which Ram exists, then, is referred to as 
Ramrajya, or an imagined Hindu utopia in which upper and lower castes exist to-
38   Badri Narayan, Memory, Identity and the Politics of Appropriation:‘Saffronisation’ Among the Dalits of North India 1, no. 1 
(2015), 9. 
39   Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva, 19. 
40   Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 174. 
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gether in unity.41 It is easy to see the appeal this might have to lower-caste groups, 
and Hindutva forces have depicted Lord Ram as he is portrayed in the Ramayana 
as a symbol of unity through his use of helpers that are depicted as Dalits.42 This 
narrative is disseminated through various means but is particularly focused on 
Dalit communities that are engaged in processes of Ethnicization: the creating and 
dredging up of communal myths and cultural narratives seems to provide Hindu-
tva activists with opportunities to inject nationalist rhetoric into these identities.43 
One example of this injection involves painting caste heroes as great defenders of 
India against historical Muslim invaders, thus aligning them metaphorically with 
Ram’s helpers in the Ramayana.44
Caught up in the Hindutva appropriation of Dalit collective memory is 
Ambedkar, the Dalit leader who, in the 1950s, led a mass conversion of Dalits 
from Hinduism to Buddhism. As many Dalits see Ambedkar as a caste hero, fa-
ther, or even folk legend, he has become open to selective re-interpretation by 
Hindtuva politicians. He is now marketed to Dalit communities as not necessar-
ily anti-Hindu because of his conversion to Buddhism over Christianity or Islam, 
because, like other religious and cultural figures, Hindutva politicians have ap-
propriated the Buddha as a Hindu figure.45 His image is even further twisted to 
portray him as anti-Muslim and therefore as pro-Hindu, which most any scholar 
on Ambedkarism would note is misguided at best.46 In making this designation, 
we understand the key Muslim-Hindu dichotomy created by Hindu nationalism, 
where to be Muslim is to be on one side of the conflict, and to be Hindu is to be 
on the other, without any room for nuance or reconciliation. This dichotomous 
designation also goes hand-in-hand with the Hindutva appropriation of Indian 
space, as we can see with the cult of Bharat Mata. 
Hinduizing Space: A Tool for Hindu Nationalism
The image of Bharat Mata, or Mother India, has been used since the founding 
of the state of India to evoke nationalist sentiment in the context of Indian inde-
pendence from colonialism.47 However, Jaffrelot points to the increasing stigma-
tization of Muslims in the 1980s and 1990s (after years of mass Dalit conversions 
to Islam in protest of what they saw as the oppressive Hindu caste system), as well 
as the rise of sub-state Islamic extremist groups as contributing to a sense of Hindu 
41   Narayan, Memory, Identity and the Politics of Appropriation, 9.
42   Ibid. 
43   Ibid., 10. 
44   Ibid., 11. 
45   Pendse, “The Dalits and Hindutva,” 78.
46   Ibid.
47   Mclean, “Embracing the Untouchables,” 496. 
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vulnerability.48 This environment of religious tension, coupled with the Hindu na-
tionalist sentiment (dating back to original texts by Hindutva founding idealist Vi-
nayak Savarkar) of an Indian nation as one whose people subscribe to the “social 
laws dictated by Hinduism,”49 produced a new image of Bharat Mata: a benevo-
lent goddess, in the tradition of Saraswati or Lakshmi, signifying the deification of 
India itself.50 This is tied to the Hindutva idea of “geo-politics as an afterthought:” 
the more than five thousand year history of Hinduism as continuing with the rise 
of the Indian nation-state, not as another religion existing within secular India.51 
As Bharat Mata is mostly used as an ideological tool in nationalist discourse, some 
scholars see this phenomenon as independent of the physical land of India and 
solely as the “us versus them” sentiment that divides Hindus from Muslims. 
However, acknowledgement of the spread of Bharat Mata as a physically wor-
shipped Hindu deity lends reason to doubt the notion of Hindutva’s “Hinduness” 
as being solely ideological. Bharat Mata temples now exist in many diverse parts 
of India, and the looseness of the ritual practices involved in worshipping Bharat 
Mata invite involvement from people of all castes, not just Brahmin priests.52 As 
such, the worship of Mother India can take place virtually anywhere, at any time, 
and by anyone, and is thus used as a tool by Hindutva activists to show the Hindu 
unity and the melting of caste structures.53 This allows Hindu nationalists to cir-
cumvent the issue of caste while simultaneously laying claim to India’s physical 
landscape (as Bharat Mata worship, along with Ganges worship, is acknowledged 
to be the deification of these physical entities), or perhaps more precisely, taking 
this landscape from Muslims who wish to claim India as their own.
We see this process of “Hinduizing” space through Hindutva claims to land-
marks associated with their imagined Hindu histories, notably the Ram Setu 
bridge controversy and the Ramjanmabhoomi campaign in Ayodhya leading to 
the destruction of the Babri Masjid temple in 1992. The Ram Setu controversy sur-
rounded the government’s plan to develop the waterway between Sri Lanka and 
India for commercial shipping, in the exact same spot Hindutva activists claimed 
Lord Ram had crossed into Sri Lanka in the Ramayana. As such, Hindutva activists 
wanted the site preserved as a historical landmark such that “Congress54 leaders 
48   Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste and Politics, 175. 
49   Ibid., 173. 
50   Mclean, “Embracing the Untouchables,” 496.
51   Reddy, Religious Identity and Political Destiny, 179. 
52   Mclean, “Embracing the Untouchables,” 497.
53   Ibid.
54   Cathal J. Nolan, 2002. “Congress Party (of India)” In Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, CathalJ. Nolan. Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO. The Congress Party has been India’s dominant political party since independence from Britain in 1948 and was 
instrumental in achieving this feat. It has consistently had a nonsectarian, completely secular and even socialist agenda, even as its 
influence has declined with the rise of identity politics toward the end of the twentieth century.  
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[might not] deal a heavy blow to the collective Hindu psyche besides reducing a 
sacred epic that defined Hindu identity and nationhood for ages, to a mere work 
of fiction.”55 Conversely, the Ramjanmabhoomi riots of 1992 involved a commu-
nal Hindu riot surrounding the Babri Masjid mosque, built during the time of Ba-
bur supposedly on the site of the historical birthplace of Lord Ram. As such, Hindu 
nationalist rioters razed the temple, resulting in thousands of deaths and a national 
wave of anti-Muslim sentiment.56 
Both of these episodes indicate the appropriation of space, whether ideologi-
cal or physical, into the Hindu fold. In terms of Dalits, though, these outbursts of 
“Hinduness,” coupled with Bharat Mata worship, signify openings into the Hindu 
society they have for so long aimed at penetrating. These openings perhaps allow 
for the physical participation in a tangible “Hinduness,” exemplified in another 
context by the physicality that is so important in Hindu worship.57 As groups ex-
isting below the caste system and outside common society, Dalits have been in-
creasingly flocking to the Hindutva message of caste unity, especially without a 
strong Ambedkar-like leader to remind them that the Hindu caste system and the 
upper-caste Hindutva supporters had oppressed them in the first place. Through 
the Hindutva ideology of xenophobia and dichotomous designation of Hindus as 
being against Muslims, scholars note that “the lack of pan-Hindu identity is ef-
fectively sublimated.”58 As such, the anger and victimization expressed by Hindu 
nationalist activists seems to act as a sort of Sanskritization tool for Dalits who feel 
the same way about the caste system: “the possibility of inclusion in Hindutva fur-
nishes Dalits with solidarity, as they channel their feelings of marginalization into 
the popularized movement that Hindutva has become.”59  
Conclusion: Comments on Othering and Suggestions for Future Inquiry
The effect of othering Muslims over low-caste Hindus seems to have brought 
many Dalit voters into the Hindutva fold, perhaps through the linking of anti-
Muslim sentiment with high-caste values, creating a Sanskritization complex sur-
rounding the othering of a group that is not Dalits. While this paper covers this 
topic, it should be noted that many factors, including individual varna politics, 
state-level policies, and the current political climate with the BJP as India’s ruling 
party, play into this paper’s conclusion. Additionally, a central question this paper 
has not covered is the effect of low-caste voters flocking to Hindutva politics on 
55   Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste and Politics, 308. 
56   Ibid., 176.
57   Kim Knott, Hinduism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
58   Mclean, “Embracing the Untouchables,” 504. 
59   Ibid., 505. 
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the upper-caste base of parties like the BJP peddling this ideology. Although Hindu 
nationalist ideology promotes the notion of Hindu unity, the caste structure is still 
very much a part of Indian society, so the actual effect of a pan-Hindu political 
party should be studied further. Therefore, an examination of current BJP poli-
cies is needed, alongside a historical analysis of the evolution of Hindutva (as it 
has been an established ideology for several decades). Scholarship in these areas 
should lend readers a more complete picture of Hindutva methods of recruiting 
Dalit voters. Another avenue for future inquiry involves the yatra traditions of re-
ligious processionals and pilgrimages and how politics play into these displays of 
public religion. Authors such as Christiane Brosius address this topic in depth, and 
the bulk of scholarship on this topic suggests that the public existence of Hinduism 
in India provides a wealth of opportunities to advance political agendas. 60
Finally, a cross-cultural study of religious nationalism might assist scholars in 
viewing political climates and religious sentiments as intimately related, rather 
than separate fields of study. As examples such as Hindutva show, religion and 
politics are often inseparable. Given the rise of non-state actors operating in the 
name of radical Islam, the religious fundamentalism of the far right in American 
politics, and the religious xenophobia on display among the conservative parties 
of Europe, a greater understanding of this intersection will be vital to confronting 
the cultural problems materializing in our globalizing world.
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